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Nelson Lichtenstein vs. Nelson
Lichtenstein and the 20th Century
Labor Question
Donna Kesselman
1 As Nelson Lichtenstein writes,  State of the Union explores the relationship between 20th
century U.S.  unions and the “labor question,”  i.e.,  the condition of  workers,  notably
marked by social injustice, industrial strife and dislocation. Why, he asks, did labor stand
far closer to the center of the nation’s political and moral consciousness than it does
today and what role has institutional unionism played here? In other words, why have
labor’s “larger ambitions” failed?
2 In this  paper,  I  hope to point out problematic continuities,  evolutions and,  at  times,
breaks in Lichtenstein’s scholarship as he came to conclusions in State of the Union, an
impressively synthetic and at once multi‑dimensional essay of America’s century‑long
labor experience.
3 First of all, I’ll look more closely at one of State of the Union’s [hereafter SOU] main theses,
what Lichtenstein himself calls a “revisionist view” of the post‑war collective bargaining
regime. Then I’ll  question the use of  some political  terminology by Lichtenstein,  and
other U.S. labor historians as well, which apparently covers different conceptual spheres
for American and European academics. Finally, these notions will be applied to the 20th
century labor experience.
Firm‑Centered Bargaining vs Politicized Bargaining1. A Revisionist View
4 Lichtenstein’s revisionism lies in his characterization of the postwar collective bargaining
model as a “defeat”, a dictate “imposed upon an all‑too reluctant labor movement in an era
of its political retreat and internal divisions” [SOU, 2002, 99, in all cases, my emphases].
He thereby takes issue with most observers for whom the so‑called postwar “social pact”
or “labor‑management accord” was the foundation of industrial prosperity during those
years, a “metaphor for pluralist democracy itself” [100]. This characterization is not new
but a more thorough elaboration of what the author’s 1995 biography of Walter Reuther,
The  Most  Dangerous  Man  in  Detroit [MDM],  already  terms  “The  collective  bargaining
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straight jacket that restricted the social visions and political strategies once advocated by
the laborite left.”
5 How did Lichtenstein come to this verdict? First through empirical observation: the idea
of  a “pact” implying harmonious labor relations was in itself  at  odds with what few
unionists who lived through the stormy period would call a stable or agreeable accord
[SOU, 98‑99]. More fundamentally, though, what changed from the preceding period was
the political frame in which bargaining took place. 
6 Thus, for Lichtenstein, the twentieth century labor question was played out during what
he dubs the “crucial fifteen years that stretched from 1933 to 1948” when the collective
bargaining regime was essentially determined in a comprehensive political sphere:
... a highly politicized system of interclass conflict and accommodation put not just
wages and working conditions in play across the negotiating table, but the fate of
the  New  Deal  impulse  itself.  Elections,  legislative  battles,  strikes,  organizing
campaigns, and labor negotiations were seamlessly interwoven. [SOU, 100]
7 It is therefore erroneous, says Lichtenstein, to refer to firm‑centered bargaining during
that time period, for the New Deal had thoroughly “politicized all relations between the
union movement, the business community and the state” [SOU, 100‑101]. In was only in
the 1950s and 1960s that collective bargaining had become a fully self‑contained system,
that unions had “matured” to become part of the establishment [SOU, 142]. 
8 With  this  analysis  Lichtenstein  consolidates  his  view  of  what  he  calls  politicized
bargaining, portraying New Deal relations as a more coherent, interlocking scheme than
he has in the past. He thus displaces the focal point of power further away from the
workplace itself than in his important earlier work on industrial democracy. Over time,
the two negotiating regimes are in fact increasingly counterpoised: the more postwar
firm‑centered  collective  bargaining  is  described  as  a  “defeat,”  the  more  politicized
bargaining of the previous period is presented as all‑inclusive. 
9 To show the evolution of the author’s arguments, let’s start with the notion of “defeat.”
In Lichtenstein’s first book, Labor’s War at Home [LWH, 1982], there is positive continuity
rather  than  conflict  between  bargaining  models:  “Building  upon  the  framework
established by the National War Labor Board, the big industrial  unions settled into a
postwar collective‑bargaining routine that increased real weekly wages some 50% in the
next two decades and greatly expanded their fringe benefit welfare packages[...]” [233].
Likewise,  while  the  regime  is  “a  dictate  [...]  imposed  on  an  all‑too  reluctant  labor
movement” in his  recent  State  of  the  Union,  the author’s  first  book described leaders
meaning to make the best of things, such as that Walter Reuther, president of the United
Automobile Workers Union (UAW) and David J. McDonald, president of the United Steel
Workers of  America,  who hoped to find “a European welfare state in each contract”
[LWH, 240].
10 In his earlier work, then, the diagnoses of postwar bargaining was not so severe, nor, in
the  previous  period,  politicized bargaining as  inclusive.  In  their  1993  book Industrial
Democracy [ID], Nelson Lichtenstein and Howell John Harris placed the decisive stakes of
democratic  society  in  the  shopfloor.  For  them,  the  very  specificity  of  mid‑century
industrial  democracy  was  its  local  focus,  a  “democratic  regime”  resulting  from
negotiating wages, hours and working conditions in each workplace; what distinguished
this industrial democracy from its Progressive Era or World War I elders was precisely
that this conception was not written into a larger vision of social change. Indeed “...the
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very phrase ‘industrial democracy’ went into eclipse, replaced by ‘collective bargaining’
as the singular definition of and means towards, democratic representation in industry.”
11 Though the authors at no time claim to embrace this ideology as their own, notably in the
book’s  pithy  introduction,  neither  do  they  reframe  workplace  democracy  within  a
comprehensive system of interdependent relations within the New Deal order. In other
words,  State  of  the  Union’s  all‑encompassing “politicized bargaining” thesis  has yet  to
mature.
12 To the contrary, Harris and Lichtenstein set out the ideological confines of contemporary
historiography, that which hailed “workers’ power” at the point of production: the very
“factory‑centered  bargaining”  (sic)  which  emerged  from  workers  struggles  on  the
shop‑floor  [Montgomery,  1979]  which  raised  “frontiers  of  power  in  the  workplace,”
[Meyer, 1987] and the “workplace rule of law” [Fraser, 1989]. “Workplace contractualism”
was another, less radical, recognition of the same epicenter [Brody, 1993]. Lichtenstein’s
own  piece  in  the  book  relates  Walter  Reuther’s  pioneering  efforts  to  codify  or
“constitutionize” labor‑management relations through binding grievance arbitration in
the 1940 GM Contract. While industrial jurisprudence did advance the union’s frontier of
control and workers’ “citizen rights” in the firm, it was a trade‑off for defusing shop‑floor
conflict and maintaining industrial discipline. In the end, given the inherent imbalance of
power,  General  Motors  soon  regained  the  initiative  and  relegated  the  institution’s
democratizing potential [ID 14].
13 The process took place, of course, within a Wagner Act mandate, but the locus of power
was decidedly local. And once again we find not opposition between pre‑ and postwar
historical bargaining models but continuity: 
...the system of  legally established contract‑orientated unionism and adversarial
collective bargaining that Americans celebrated as the means to, or the realization
of, “democracy in industry” between the 1930s and the 1960s may well be [in the
1990s] in terminal crisis [ID, 3].
14 Lichtenstein’s 1995 biography of Walter Reuther, The Most Dangerous Man in Detroit takes a
step towards a more systemic political construct. Thus, factory contract administration is
the application of New Deal political  economy at the microsocial  level  and industrial
jurisprudence, the heart of the New Deal industrial relations: 
Although grievance arbitration is not mentioned in the Wagner Act, mechanisms
for  peacefully  resolving  the  ‘labor  question,’  for  constitutionalizing  and
ameliorating shop conflict, were a product of more than half a century of agitation,
experimentation and legal reform [...] strong unions and stable industrial relations
[were] the key to a Keynesian relation of the economy and the extension of political
democracy to the realm of the shop and office. [144] 
15 Finally, in State of the Union industrial democracy is blown up into full‑fledged political
doctrine:  “[...]  an idea [which] came to stand as a solution to the nation’s social  and
economic ills.” At the same time, the New Deal’s master plan for workplace democracy is
expressed through the words of Senator Wagner: “Industrial tyranny is incompatible with
a republican form of government.”
16 Lichtenstein’s  revisionist  view  of  postwar  collective  bargaining  as  a  “defeat”—a
deliberately  strong  and  provocative  term—is  a  corollary  of  his  New Deal  politicized
bargaining  synthesis.  Accordingly,  the  more  pronounced  the  characterization  of  the
former, the more sweeping and democratic a “victory” is the latter. This hypothesis is a
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departure from conventional scholarship and also revises, or rather reformulates his own
prior historical perspective. 
2. Periodization
17 One gauge of New Deal and labor historiography is the question of periodization. In other
words, defining “what” milestones most influenced the labor question is not unrelated to
“when” they occurred. Lichtenstein scholarship remains globally coherent with regard to
chronology, as we hope to show.
18 From an albeit somewhat schematic view, two main approaches to periodization prevail
regarding New Deal and labor historiography; in both, a given author’s appreciation of
the “New Deal” is most frequently tinged with that of the CIO. A first group of historians
see the game of the New Deal and industrial unionism as having been essentially played
out in the 1930s, for better or for worse.
19 Among them are Sidney Fine, Irving Bernstein, Robert H. Ziegler, and Lizabeth Cohen;
they  hail  both  the  government  regime  and  industrial  unionism  as  progressive  and
interacting. For Cohen, Chicago workers declared themselves to be, at one and the same
time, trade unionists affiliated to the CIO, supporters of the New Deal and “loyal” to the
Democratic Party. In another light, Margaret Weir and Theda Skocpol regard the period
from 1936 to 1939 as presenting the first, and the last, hope of seeing a form of social
Keynesianism realized in the USA; the unprecedented influence of the workers' unions
and program on the Democratic Party policy explains this exceptional opening.
20 Among the same group from the standpoint of chronology, but less enthusiastic about the
state  regime,  there  is  David  Brody [1993]  who accents  not  change but  continuity  in
unionism: the New Deal did not introduce the great innovations which some would have
us believe. More critical scholars present the New Deal as an integrating force of the
social movement which doomed progressive prospects of emerging unionism. The jurist
Christopher Tomlins’s analysis is a subtle one: before the end of the decade New Deal
institutions had already revealed they were intended to canalize the possibilities of the
social  movement and prioritize needs of  production.  The school  of  Corporate Liberal
Theory is openly critical of both the New Deal and of industrial unionism, especially its
leaders, whose bureaucratic nature was manifest from the start.1
21 The other group of historians, including Lichtenstein, places the New Deal’s stakes over
the longer term. The governmental experience represented, in itself, a progressive gain,
which made the coming of industrial trade unionism easier. The two phenomena evolved,
as it were, on an equal footing: the gains of the young trade unions were lost to the extent
that the new governmental experiment found itself slowing down; the CIO’s progressive
character waned in relation to its own transformation into a moderating force of the
social movement, roughly corresponding to the advent of the Cold War. 
22 David Montgomery suggests that, while the CIO alliance with the Democratic Party dated
back to the 1930s, its crucial aspect was the reactionary turn in this party’s foreign policy
during the Cold War, thereby calling into question both CIO and New Deal gains. For Mike
Davis,  industrial union leaders took advantage of the Cold War to increase their own
power: in the process they undermined the class‑consciousness and organization working
people had won during the 1930s which could have influenced the Democratic Party in a
progressive direction. More specifically in automobile, Martin Halpern regards the period
from 1946  to  1947  as  equally  decisive,  because  the  victory  of  the  Communist  Party
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supported union tendency in the UAW would have changed the course of American trade
unionism in the progressive direction. 
23 By setting the stakes in that “crucial fifteen year” stretch (1933 to 1948) mentioned above,
Nelson Lichtenstein in his work finds their place here. The author identifies the pivotal
turn of events between 1946 and 1948 when “a powerful re‑mobilization of conservative
and employers’  forces” arose to block the ambitions of  the workers’  movement.  This
helped to bring about the “forced retreat” of the New Deal, its economic and social, as of
the wider political forces which had supported it, notably the progressive wing of the
Democratic Party and industrial union leaders who joined to form what was thereafter
termed  the  labor‑liberal  alliance.  In  the  years  after  1948  the  industrial  unions,
particularly  the  UAW,  abdicated  “any  sustained  struggle  over  the  structure  of  the
political economy,” choosing instead to “privatize the welfare state” through collective
bargaining victories [“From Corporatism to Collective Bargaining”, 1989]. Referring to the
same period in The Most Dangerous Man in Detroit, Lichtenstein describes the “lurch to the
right after the war” and its eventual outcome: “The political impasse drove American trade
unions toward negotiation of their own firm‑centered welfare state.” (in all cases, my
emphasis).
24 And State of the Union enhances the immediate postwar conservative turn in American
politics which “put union militancy and shop activism under a cloud,” defeating labor’s
“larger ambitions.” Among the decisive factors were two exceptionally hostile forces in
American life:  corporate management generally, and industrial and agricultural white
“oligarchs” of the South, in particular.  Then came Taft‑Hartley, which restrained any
serious  attempt to  project  a  class‑wide political  economic strategy ...  “the stage was
therefore set for the union‑management ‘accord’ that framed industrial relations during
the next three decades.”
25 Thus Lichtenstein sets  the  chronological  frame to  both politicized bargaining,  which
preceded the postwar turn, and the factory‑centered collective bargaining regime which
would ensue. The substance is that the progressive nature of collective bargaining and
industrial unionism depended heavily upon the evolution of the New Deal and its political
base: this is synthesized in State of the Union’s elaboration of “politicized bargaining.”
26 Lichtenstein, in the long run, remains globally true to his own chronological line. But
exceptions to the rule also reflect, as we have suggested, the appreciation he has, at any
given moment, of the New Deal, the CIO and relations between them. More concretely,
this  translates  in Lichtenstein through increasingly precise formulations of  collective
bargaining as a comprehensive regime and of its subsequent defeat.
3. Cause and Effect
27 In the cases mentioned above, external political and social forces are presented as the
determining factors in curbing New Deal progressiveness, labor’s ambitions and union
militancy to the point of “defeat,” i.e. the resulting postwar collective bargaining regime.
The excerpts in italics in the above‑mentioned quotes highlight these cause and effect
mechanisms:
• a defeat “imposed upon an all‑too reluctant labor movement in an era of its political retreat
and internal division,”
• the “conservative turn in American politics after WWII [which] put union militancy and shop
activism under a cloud;”
• “a powerful re‑mobilization of conservative and employers’ forces” led to a “forced retreat,”
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• “The political impasse drove American trade unions toward negotiation [...] of their own
firm‑centered welfare state...,”
28 Other factors also contribute to the postwar turn of events.
29 First among them is the record of the Truman government. The failure of government to
interfere in corporate pricing during the 1945‑46 General Motors strike and then the
collapse of price controls the next summer denoted a defeat for politicized “economic
bargaining.” It helped result, says Lichtenstein, in the Republican Party’s resurgence in
that fall’s midterm elections.
30 The Most Dangerous Man In Detroit also provides a micro‑explanation, how one key player
helped  consolidate  firm‑centered  bargaining.  While  the  biographical  genre  begs,  of
course, such readings, it is nonetheless difficult to overstate Walter Reuther’s influence
on organized industrial labor during his times. Lichtenstein writes: 
By 1947, Reuther had become a prisoner of the GM contract. He had held too many
bargaining sessions, filed too many grievance appeals... to risk the destruction of
the social order with which both sides had made their decade‑long accommodation.
[MDM, 261‑262]
31 All these factors converge to support Lichtenstein’s thesis of the postwar turn. The 1946
midterm elections were the turning point, the return of a Republican majority which
placed containment of union power and “privatization” of collective bargaining at the top
of its agenda. Lichtenstein therefore refers to “before and after” the 1946 elections: “In
the wake of the massive Republican victory of November 1946, Reuther made a rhetorical
about‑face,  now  urging  ‘free  labor’  and  ‘free  management’  to  join  in  solving  their
problems...” [MDM, 261‑262].
32 Given these electoral results CIO leaders announced they were not going to wait “for
perhaps another 10 years until the Social Security laws are amended adequately” and
therefore, looked for other negotiating alternatives. [MDM] 
33 While  these  explanations  and  factors  are  not  mutually  exclusive,  and  as  careful  a
historian Lichtenstein is when documenting and balancing social forces, clarification as
to  how  they  interrelate,  the  cause  and  effect  relationship,  would  give  them  more
argumentative clout. What fundamentally caused the eclipse of what Lichtenstein calls
politicized  bargaining  or,  in  more  general  terms,  how  did  workers  and  unions  find
themselves on the defensive in the early postwar period?
34 Regarding the nature of the New Deal, close Lichtenstein readers might also wonder why
a number of strong arguments the author has made in the past have not reappeared in
State  of  the  Union.  They  tend  to  be  critical  of  New  Deal  politics  and  present  a  less
consensual image of its political base among workers. Consequently, they view politicized
bargaining  as  a  less  commanding  force  and  firm‑centered  bargaining  more  directly
rooted in the New Deal period than in State of the Union.
35 Earlier Lichtenstein scholarship thus shed a different light on the 1946’s turn of events.
The  1946  midterms  were  a  setback  for  labor‑liberal  electoralism,  but  its  causes  and
significance cannot be explained by merely external or conjunctural factors. For if the
CIO‑Democratic Party alliance and the welfare state had really been a salvaging force for
working families, if government policies had been perceived as convincingly progressive,
then the widespread worker abstentionism—which is what actually lost these elections
for the Democrats—would have meant that workers themselves had been swept up in the
“conservative turn,” as State of the Union seems to imply. If not, what can explain such a
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brutal  turn,  a  defeat?  For  at  the  time,  workers  were  not  on  the  defensive,  notes
Lichtenstein  elsewhere:  “American  unions  certainly  had  the  power  and  capacity  to
conduct  such politicized bargaining.  By  1945,  the  trade unions  stood near  their  20th
century apogee...” [SOU, 100]. And the year 1946 saw unionized workers in movement, it
witnessed  unprecedented  industrial  actions,  from  the  winter  strike  waves  to
industry‑wide general  strikes.  President  Truman had taken a  hard line  during those
strikes,  but  Democrats  running  for  election,  especially  those  in  working  class
constituencies, continued to run on their New Deal record.
36 Disaffection from Democrats was in fact not a new phenomenon in 1946.  Events and
earlier Lichtenstein attest to unprecedented attempts by workers to develop independent
political  alternatives  to  the  two  major  parties,  to  the  point  of  departing  from  the
Democratic  Party  sphere.  Farmer‑Labor  parties  and  the  popularity  of  labor  party
sentiment was already spreading in the late 1930s; in 1937, over 20% polled said they
would join a labor party, not to mention vote for one [Lipset, 278]. New Deal governors of
industrial states were thus upbraided for their bloody crackdown of the 1937 Little Steel
strikes,  including  the  infamous  Republic  Steel  “Memorial  Day  Massacre.”  In  1992
Lichtenstein did not pull any punches when criticizing New Deal Democrats for 1937: “In
Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Ohio, three states that were central battlegrounds for the CIO
organizing  campaigns,  prominent  Democratic  politicians  [...]  turned  the  power  of
government  against  the  unions”  [Who  Built  America,  416].  Widespread  working  class
abstentionism in the 1942 midterms, reflecting dissatisfaction with the war regime, was a
wake‑up  call  for  CIO  leaders  who  then  formed  the  nation’s  first  Political  Action
Committee to massively get out the labor vote for FDR in 1944. Previous Lichtenstein
writings  have  shown  that  even  within  Reuther’s  circle  third  party  sentiment  was
commonplace, that a break with Democrats was close in the postwar [MDM, 304‑5], that
Reuther himself came out in 1948 for a party based on labor before finally rallying to
Truman and the Democrats;  Reuther continued to toy with alternatives on its liberal
fringes through groupings like the Americans for Democratic Action. The 1948 Wallace
campaign expressed this phenomenon in its own way.
37 In other words, Lichtenstein’s brand of politicized bargaining was not so solidly rooted in
key sectors of the working population. What’s more, as viewed from the shop‑floor at the
time, it did not appear wholly progressive, especially as the realities of the mandatory
grievance arbitration system took hold. In addition to the objective or subjective factors
mentioned thus far, collective bargaining itself fell victim, says Lichtenstein, to its own
inner logic, which necessarily dampening shop‑floor militancy: 
The  situation  was  inherently  unstable,  even  before  the  conservative  turn in
American  politics  put  union  militancy  and  shop  floor  activism  under  a  cloud.
Whatever its inherent legitimacy among rank‑and‑file workers, the shop traditions
that periodically shut down the line or disrupted production subverted the very
idea of a collective‑bargaining agreement. Managers denounced such activism as
illegitimate  ‘wildcat’  stoppages  that  violated  the  contract  and  robbed  collective
bargaining of its usefulness. They complained that unless union leaders guaranteed
labor peace during the life of an agreement, their incentive to bargaining would
disappear. And most union officials, from John L. Lewis and Sidney Hillman right
down to the most radical local union leaders,  had to recognize the logic of this
imperative, which is one reason that a tradition of shop syndicalism never quite
achieved the kind of legitimacy in the past‑1940 era that it had won during the era
of the Industrial Workers of the World a generation before. [SOU, 62]
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38 Given the very nature of collective bargaining, and the “orderly” relations it requires in
each workplace, the balance of class power was clearly shifted into management hands.
[MDM, 153] This order was secured though the stabilization of union leadership, thanks
to the system of industrial jurisprudence’s introduction of the union shop: 
At this most immediate and crudely political level, Reuther and the other union
officials  wanted  an  umpire  system in  order  to  protect  the  leadership  from the
consequences  of  undisciplined  shop‑floor  militancy.  GM  department
representatives  had found their  days  and nights  consumed with stopping these
wildcat stoppages [“Great Expectations,” 129]. 
39 Such was the existential  dilemma of trade unionists,  that of  conciliating the right to
strike with the daily functioning stability of contractual relations. After taking political
advantage of the former UAW president’s attempt to stabilize the internal union regime,
Reuther himself  fell  prey to the same dilemma and risks:  “Like Martin,  Reuther had
become a  prisoner  of  the  corporation’s  demand for  continuous  production,  and like
Martin,  he was coming under attack from militants in the shop” [MDM, 147].  It  was
nevertheless  in the name of  workers’  power,  and the much trumpeted “ideology” of
industrial  democracy,  that  workers  were  deprived,  as  of  the  1930s,  of  their  most
elementary source of power, that of shutting down the process of production. 
40 In this way, industrial jurisprudence ultimately swayed the firm‑level balance of power in
favor of management. To counteract its local advantage, labor’s only solution would be to
look to the realm of national politics and the transformation of the American state: such
was the politicized dimension of the bargaining regime. But many laborites would take
issue  with  the  premise  that  even  an  all‑inclusive  political  construct  could  offset
management  prerogatives  if  not  grounded  in  workers’  fundamental  power  over
production: the 1930s political and social legacy, all will agree, is inseparable from strike
and struggle.  So in the final analysis,  the degree to which politicized bargaining was
actually achieved is more debatable than State of the Union leads the reader to believe.
41 We have seen through this overview of Lichtenstein, culminating in State of the Union, that
the more postwar bargaining is  portrayed as  a  defeat  the more it  is  opposed to the
preceding  system  of  politicized  bargaining.  This  historical  frame  implies  a
characterization of the New Deal, and its balance of social forces right down to the shop
floor,  as  being  intent  upon  and  able  to  ensure  equitable  collective  bargaining.
Lichtenstein  thus  consolidates  his  hypotheses  over  time  and  by  doing  so,  globally
reinforces his own chronological approach, which places the key turn of contemporary
politics  in  the  immediate  postwar  period.  But  in  order  to  justify  his  most  recent
hypothesis of postwar firm‑centered collective bargaining as outright defeat he tends to
lend the New Deal ever greater virtues, to the point, we believe, of weakening or even
omitting previous arguments whereby the author explained how labor had found itself on
the defensive, especially due to unfulfilled political expectations.
Defining Labor’s Multiple Roles
42 We would like to highlight here some terms that are used by a number of American labor
historians, and Lichtenstein in particular, and which cover different conceptual spheres
than  when  used  in  Europe.  They  include  corporatism,  popular  front  and  social
democracy. The way they are applied in the United States reveals one dimension of labor
and 20th century labor questions which we believe needs to be further addressed, i.e. the
multiple roles that trade unionism adopted in the postwar period.
1. Clarifying Terms
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43 In  the  U.S.,  “corporatism/corporatist”  is  essentially  interchangeable  with  tripartite,
meaning any joint government, industry and labor body, most prominently those set up
within the World War II defense state. This participation was active and enthusiastically
undertaken by CIO unionists, from Washington’s economic commissions down to local
defense industry centers like Detroit,  where UAW officials helped implement wartime
manpower policies in factories and public services in communities (transportation, day
care [...]).  American labor historians tend to present corporatism as a largely positive
phenomenon, an opportunity for laborite influence in public affairs. In doing so, they are
but mirroring a major aspiration of most CIO labor leaders at the time, especially the
United Automobile Workers Union’s (UAW) Walter Reuther. Thus, when referring to the
politicized nature of labor relations during the war Lichtenstein notes: “Corporatism of
this sort placed capital‑labor relations within a highly centralized government context,
where representatives of the contending ‘peak’ organizations bargained politically for
their respective constituencies” [SOU, 101].
44 As  for  Walter  Reuther,  “an  imaginative  planner,  he  would  link  union  power  with
government authority in what we might label today a ‘corporatist’ framework [...] a more
stable  and  humane  framework”[MDM,  155].  The  term  comes  back  repeatedly  in
Lichtenstein and most often in this positive light: when questioning whether the old New
Dealers succeeded in their last attempt to politicize the bargaining regime, his chapter
subtitle reads “Corporatism in the Sixities?” [SOU, 132].
45 In  Europe  the  distinction  between  tripartism and  corporatism is  crucial.  At  its  best
“tripartism” is  a balanced playing field of  social  partners where unions impose their
demands upon government and business,  thanks to their  degree of  organization and
mobilization. On the other hand “corporatism” is opposite in nature, for since Mussolini’s
attempt to destroy independent organizations through their integration into the state
apparatus, it has been associated with fascism. As unions became direct instruments of
running the economy, class struggle was subordinated to upholding the “common good.”
46 The “popular front” was the name of  1930s government coalitions bringing together
Communists, Socialists and left‑leaning bourgeois parties against the fascist threat. (In
France, the socialist S.F.I.O. governed with the bourgeois Radical Party, the Communist
Party  remaining  outside  but  giving  critical  support.)  Popular  Front  coalitions  were
broader alliances against fascism including trade unions and associations, as in the U.S.
during that time, around the U.S. Communist Party. “Social Democracy” officially means
those political parties having origins in the Second International (France’s S.F.I.O. meant
“French Section of the Workers’ International). In the forefront of 20th century struggles
for  welfare  state  reforms  within  the  capitalist  system,  these  “reformist”  parties  are
distinguished  from  “revolutionary”  Communist  parties  which  promoted  the  violent
overthrow of capitalism to achieve social transformation. It should be noted that Socialist
parties traditionally have their roots in the working class, linked to the trade unions and
are component parts of the “labor movement.” Such is not systematically the case in U.S.
labor history, where “social democracy” is freely applied to the non‑communist left, labor
and even liberal Democrats.
47 Reference to American “social  democracy” is  frequently found in Lichtenstein’s work
when describing welfare state programs or policies, unions or political trends. Walter
Reuther’s agenda was that of an “American Social Democracy” [chapter title, MDM] and
Reuther “understood, as so many did not, that for labor’s voice to carry real weight he
had  to  reshape  the  consciousness  of  millions  of  industrial  workers,  making  them
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disciplined trade unionists,  militant  social  democrats,  and racial  egalitarians”  [MDM,
301]. The label in the strict sense could formally apply to Reuther himself; who had been a
card‑carrying member of the the U.S. Socialist Party and then later worked with Social
Democratic parties around the world.
48 The New Deal was for all intents and purposes, America’s “Popular Front.” Likewise, the
New  Deal  coalition  regrouping  CIO  unionists  and  liberal  Democrats  became  the
homegrown version of  Social  Democracy,  occupying the equivalent  political  space to
social  democratic  or  labor  parties  in  Western  Europe  and  the  Commonwealth.
Lichtenstein says as much, regarding the 1944 elections and the PAC: “Unionism boosted
turnout  and Democratic  Party  loyalty  for  fully  a  third of  the  electorate,  so  partisan
politics  in  the  early  postwar  era  had  something  of  a  social‑democratic flavor”  [SOU,
104‑105].
49 Such assimilations are both intellectually satisfying and useful to highlight trends among
workers’  experiences worldwide.  They conveniently fill  the gap left by that aspect of
American “exceptionalism” which is the lack of any mass political organization speaking
in the name of working people and their families. But the amalgamations can also be
problematic when referring to political parties without references to their historical or
class roots, or clouding over the distinct nature between unions and political parties.
50 This “nature” derives from their particular constituencies, from the differing roles and
responsibilities  that  respectively  incur  upon  labor  parties  and  labor  unions  in  a
democratic  society  and  which,  in  most  countries,  create  a  sort  of  division  of  labor
between them. And so, while political parties entering government and making public
policy are part of their function, the same is not true of unions. During France’s Popular
Front, for example, even while Socialist Party leaders were in government, unionists were
in  the  factories  and  the  streets  mobilizing  massive  support  among  the  working
population for institutional reforms: each carried out its own, indispensable roles, on its
own specific ground.
51 The  absence  of  this  kind  of  division  of  labor  and  its  consequences  constitute  one
dimension of the U.S. labor question which is rarely addressed. By not doing so, labor
historians only reproduce a quasi‑permanent confusion between “political” and “trade
union” activities, which is a characteristic trait of the New Deal‑CIO coalition itself. The
current consensus around the AFL‑CIO’s “social unionism” finds its origins here. 
52 One expression of this confusion is the free and interchangeable use of adjectives like
“liberal”  and  “progressive.”  The  lack  of  definition  or  distinction  has  at  least  one
significant effect, that of blurring class lines. And so, armed with liberal and progressive
credentials,  the labor‑liberal  alliance is  automatically deemed apt to defend workers’
interests  in  electoral  politics  and  government  spheres.  Blurred  class  lines  are  a
precondition for the loose application of terms like social democratic to a party with no
working class roots. Thus UAW liberalism aspired to bring about the “crystallization of a
social democratic current inside the urban‑labor wing of the Democratic Party” [MDM, 306,
chapter “An American Social Democracy”]. 
53 Free  use  of  political  notions  also  serves  to  minimize  the  import  of  World  War  II
“corporatism.”  As  long  as  unions’  roles  were  judged  progressive,  their
quasi‑governmental functions in running the wartime state apparatus at all levels were
taken for granted. But this corporatism resulted in U.S. labor leaders adopting multiple
roles, in addition to those directly associated with the trade union mandate.
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2. Labor’s Multiple Roles
54 Among labor  historians,  Lichtenstein goes  furthest  in  exploring the  repercussions  of
World War II labor statesmanship for workers and their trade unions. In a chapter aptly
entitled “A Faustian Bargain” [Labor’s War at Home] he points out the pros and cons of
such a corporatist bargain. Wartime agencies, especially the tripartite War Labor Board,
socialized much of the trade union movement’s prewar agenda, thus making gains like
seniority  and  grievance  systems  standard  entitlements  for  extended  working  class
sectors. 
55 But Lichtenstein still asks, were unionists like Reuther making a Faustian bargain? Their
unions had become “ensnared in a process that would cede much freedom and legitimacy
to the warfare state” and the no‑strike pledge—whereby unionists committed themselves
to the war effort,  striving to ensure continued war production by blocking industrial
actions—inevitably  opposed  union  leaders  to  their  own  militant  rank  and  file.  The
multiplication  of  tasks  which  came  with  running  the  war  through  participation  in
government agencies would bloat union bureaucracy. As a tireless legislator, lobbyist,
planner, tribune, Walter Reuther was the emblematic labor statesman. His Washington
work  “distanced  him  from  ordinary  workers  and  feisty  local  union  officers,  whose
interests he now felt to be but one pressure among many within this half‑constructed
corporatist  order”  [MDM,  181].  This  “distance”  taken  by  Reuther  and  others  was
therefore  from their  role  as  trade  union  leaders,  which  is  primarily  defined  by  the
mandate they receive to satisfy their members’ demands. In the meantime, they were
assuming multiple identities  as  state managers,  Washington lobbyists,  politicians and
finally campaign operatives who spared no efforts to rally unconditionally for an FDR
victory in 1944.
56 All  of  this  converged in politicized bargaining’s  aim of  accomplishing labor’s  “larger
ambitions,” which, in Lichtenstein, is a euphemism for its political agenda. But at the
same time, political bargaining’s all‑encompassing mandate obliges both trade unionists,
and their historians, to clarify terms. Which movement should be labeled as progressive
or social‑democratic, and therefore endorsed in a year like 1944? On the one hand, there
were  CIO  statesmen  who,  by  choosing  to  uphold  the  defense  state  rallied  workers
electorally and so “boosted turnout and Democratic loyalty” [State of the Union]. On the
other, there were rank and file workers starting to move in the opposite direction, away
from the Democratic Party. In the past, Lichtenstein has enhanced the content of political
independence in groupings like the UAW’s Rank and File Tendency which, at the union’s
1944 convention, clamored at once to revoke the no‑strike pledge, break with the defense
state and form a third party, a new political party defending the interest of workers.
57 Which one of the movements is progressive for Lichtenstein? Both one and the other,
depending on the bibliographical reference in question. Industrial unionists were trying
to assume their multiple roles. But they could not at once integrate and uphold state
institutions  as  labor  statesmen  and  simultaneously  mobilize  workers’  countervailing
power around their particular interests, as unions had done in the 1930s—on both sides of
the Atlantic—resulting in the transformation of state institutions for the popular, not the
“common,” good. Building upon their experience in the World War II defense state, U.S.
unionists would pursue their new identities and thereby help shape the model of postwar
labor. 
3. The Postwar Model of Trade Unionism
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58 What we have called labor’s “multiple roles” brought some unions to act as—or occupy
the  space  of—political  party,  lobby,  electoral  machine,  family  or  community  center,
hospital, bank, insurance company... 
59 Politically, it has been argued that one union, the UAW, became the preeminent force of
liberalism in postwar  America.  The automobile  workers  devoted enormous means to
influencing government intervention into the economy, the growth of the welfare state,
civil rights, U.S. foreign policy in the Cold War. For Walter Reuther, the UAW’s role in
promoting a liberal America was indispensable, for the Democratic Party was “not a labor
party” [Boyle, 1995].
60 AFL‑CIO unionists were still  labor statesmen in the 1960s.  At the very moment when
America’s  cities  and  neighborhoods  were  ablaze,  these  statesmen turned  once  again
towards  government  agencies  and  tripartite  action  from  above  to  resolve  working
people’s  ills,  as through President Kennedy’s Labor‑Management Advisory committee.
Lichtenstein himself begs for a comparison with the World War II governing regime when
placing this experience under the auspices of “corporatism” [State of the Union].
61 One conspicuous role, that of labor “lobby,” is particularly illustrative of the effects such
activities and the causes they defend could have on the nature of unions. It was not just
labor’s detractors, be they traditional conservative foes or, as Lichtenstein notes, former
industrial pluralist allies, who labeled labor as mere lobby. It is worth noting to what
extent  the  AFL‑CIO  enthusiastically  embraced  this  role,  to  the  point  of  becoming  a
forerunner for modern public interest groups and political  action committees.  In the
1950s and 1960s, the AFL‑CIO and its C.O.P.E. lobbying branch defending causes as diverse
as public housing and aid for the poor, Medicare, national public education.
62 In these instances, the labor lobby’s primary constituencies were not necessarily union
members: certainly not the poor receiving aid for—almost as a rule—union members had
higher‑than‑average living standards for working people. As for public housing, whereas
the UAW aspired housing for one third of the population, and despite mammoth efforts,
only a small fraction of the population ever profited and even a smaller proportion of
union families. The 1963 national law on education was a case in point, for the labor lobby
deliberately favored constituencies other than its own members. In the name of obtaining
a federally  mandated law to  ensure  equal  educational  opportunities  for  all  children,
whatever the socio‑economic level of the communities where they reside, the federation
and teachers’ unions had to engage in tough give‑and‑take bargaining to gain concessions
from competing lobbies, mostly private confessional schools. And as the bargaining logic
goes, gaining concessions meant trading off labor’s most powerful bargaining chip, which
in this case was teacher salary demands, ultimately the big losers of the law. Finally,
industrial workers as well were somewhat critical of the AFL‑CIO’s legislative lobbying
priorities as shop‑floor working conditions degraded and accidents multiplied. Despite
this  era  of  labor’s  greatest  organized  strength,  of  crushing  two‑thirds  Democratic
majorities  with  undivided  government,  a  law  regulating  even  elementary  workplace
safety and health issues, the 1970 Occupational Safety and Health Act, obtained much too
little and came way too late.
63 These  examples  illustrate  to  what extent  the  multiple  roles  played  by  labor  leaders
“distanced” them from their elementary function of carrying out the union mandate. And
so what began with labor statesmen’s rapprochement to the World War II defense state
apparatus ended up impacting the very model of trade unionism in the United States. The
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interests of “ordinary workers and feisty local union officers” had now institutionally
become  but  “one  pressure  among  many”  among  the  various  constituencies  of  labor
leaders.
64 In this way, in their efforts to solve the labor question, unions played a variety of roles.
This experience deserves more attention when considering the state of 20th century U.S.
unionism? The roles sought to channel national political protest through institutional
pressure, reserving militant strike action to support firm‑centered contract negotiations.
In this way as well, they date back to the wartime imperative for social peace.
65 Thus  the  questions  we’d  like  to  address  to  Nelson Lichtenstein.  To  what  extent  did
wartime  corporatism,  in  the  sense  of  state  institutions  tending  to  integrate  class
organizations and struggle,  affect the nature of  U.S.  unions? And especially,  how did
unions’ multiple roles affect the postwar “defeat,” be this on the grounds of elections,
legislation  or  contract  negotiating?  For  Lichtenstein,  labor’s  multifaceted  identity  is
presented  as  an  inherent  trait  of  U.S.  trade  unionism.  American  organized  labor  is
“unique and transcendent,  for the unions combine features inherent to an expansive
social  movement,  an ideological  formation,  a  political  lobby effort  and an institution
designed to micromanage the labor market, both inside the workplace and out” [SOU].
66 However,  these  innovative  attempts  to  satisfy  labor’s  “larger  ambitions”  have  had
implications upon the nature and model of postwar labor, notably the “distance” they
introduced between leaders  and members.  And the  relinquishment  of  more  militant
forms of workers protest implied was not indifferent to the “distance” labor took from
the social movements of the 1960s. 
Conclusion: Nelson Lichtenstein vs Walter Reuther
67 In conclusion, the reader should not be surprised to find many references made to Walter
Reuther in this paper, as in Lichtenstein, his biographer. In many ways, Lichtenstein’s
pursuance of unions and the 20th century labor question has been what one might call a
“career‑long,  academic  factional  struggle”  with  the  ideological,  idealistic,  combative
leader of industrial America’s path‑breaking union. I first met Nelson during the summer
of 1985 at Wayne State University’s Walter Reuther Archives in Detroit. Years later, in
1997, Nelson was surprised when I recalled how already at that time, 10 years before the
publication of his landmark biography, he was already pondering, ruminating, throwing
out ideas and testing formulations, concerned about how to best do historical justice to
Reuther and the narrative history of industrial unionism he was about to write.
68 In this sense, it is safe to say that the publication of his landmark 1995 biography of
Walter  Reuther  was,  for  Lichtenstein,  as  much history  as  catharsis.  He  recounts  the
militant life of an exceptional figure who spent most of his waking hours fighting, for his
conception of democracy in the workplace, for more unionism in a better America, for
power within his own organization and without. As a conclusion, in the face of the labor
movement’s erstwhile woes, Lichtenstein opened future perspectives by asking “What
would Walter do?” 
69 Seven years later with State of the Union, Lichtenstein ends with his own ideas about how
labor should meet the challenges of  the new century.  To this  effect,  he answers the
question: “What would Nelson do?”
70 Lichtenstein’s main design is to rebuild and reinforce trade unions.  He explains why,
despite  its  recent  emergence  and  certain  advantages  in  the  courts,  the so‑called
rights‑based  model  of  social  regulation  cannot  replace  one  based  on  the  collective
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advancement  of  mutual  interests.  This  defense  of  unions  as  a  component  part  of
democracy is welcome at a time when some would like to dissolve trade unions into the
indiscriminate context of “civil society.”
71 The author concludes with three strategic proposals for the future of labor which, maybe
not surprisingly, bring Walter Reuther to mind. 
72 The first is the need for “militancy,” as the union movement was built and has always
imposed its  will  through struggle.  The leader of  some of  the century’s  great  strikes,
Reuther would certainly agree.
73 The second is “internal democracy.” This is where the two most diverge: the UAW’s tough
internal regime under Reuther would not meet the standards of participatory culture
urged by Lichtenstein to democratize labor organizations.
74 Finally,  there is  the “political  dimension.”  Lichtenstein concludes with an appeal  for
political action in favor of labor’s legislative agenda and workplace rights. He advances
the need for a strong social‑democratic movement, linking unionists to a broader liberal
constituency and for  independent  labor political  action within the broad Democratic
Party sphere.
75 For all intents and purposes, regarding labor’s role in society and politics, what would
Nelson  do?  Pretty  much what  Walter  would  have  done.  It  seems,  then,  that  in  this
career‑long factional struggle, as was often the case in such struggles, Walter has won. 
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1. Among other academics in this group, Stanley Aronowitz, Staughton Lynd...
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